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1  Introduction 
 
One of the remarkable aspects of development in the world trading system for the last 
20 years is a rapid increase in the number of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements 
such as free trade areas (FTAs) and customs unions. The rapid spread of these regional 
trade agreements or RTAs has presented a sharp contrast to the fact that multilateral 
trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) system have long been 
deadlocked during the same 20-year period. This increase of RTAs should thus be, at 
least partly, because countries have found or tried to find in RTAs a way to promote 
their trade after being tired of inconclusive multilateral trade negotiations that have 
become (much) more difficult than were they under the former GATT system, due to 
various reasons.  
Another notable phenomenon that should also characterize the last 20-year 
development in the international trade environment is growing concerns about possible 
negative impacts of globalization, particularly on social values such as workers’ 
rights/conditions or the natural environment. These concerns are often expressed as 
fears of “races to the bottom” through which domestic labor or environment standards 
in countries will erode due to cost-saving pressures in keener global competition 
brought by growing international trade and investment. Also have there been persistent 
arguments against the possibility of “social dumping” through which some countries 
“unfairly” lower labor or environment standards and conditions to create or maintain a 
cost advantage over other producers in the international markets. Some governments 
have found a way to respond to these public, commercial or political concerns by 
providing in trade agreements “social clauses” that are provisions requiring, urging, or 
requesting the signatories of the trade agreements to maintain a certain level or degree 
of their domestic labor or environment standards. (In what follows, I will focus on the 
issues in labor standards or labor clauses.) Having these two notable features in recent 
development in the world trading system, the total number of RTAs as well as the 
number of RTAs with labor clauses have been rapidly growing since the late 1990s, as 
shown in Figure 1.  
To discuss the labor clauses in trade agreements and their relevance, it is 
important to examine the following two questions: (i) Does globalization really 
deteriorate domestic labor standards or working conditions in countries in the 
world—i.e., have either races to the bottom or “dumping” practices in labor standards 
really been the case?; and (ii) Are labor clauses in trade agreements—or is ruling or 
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handling domestic labor issues in trade agreements—effective for a case in which 
domestic labor standards and conditions erode in relation with globalization? On the 
first of these two questions, there is a large volume of research. The theoretical studies 
are overall skeptical about the view in which low or weak labor standards create or 
improve export competitiveness of a country. Empirical studies have failed to find 
evidence supporting the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis that low or weak labor standards 
are brought by export-competition pressure. Some pieces of literature have rather found 
evidence supporting an opposite possibility, that is, better or stricter labor standards will 
be linked to a larger volume of exports or the attraction of inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Further review of the literature is left to Brown et al. (2011) and 
Kamata (2014) that offer a more comprehensive and detailed literature review on the 
issues in trade and labor standards.  
However, some pieces of more recent literature have indeed found evidence for 
the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis in relation with growth in international trade or FDI, 
particularly in the labor rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining, or 
the FACB rights. Mosley and Uno (2007) use a unique cross-country and time-series 
dataset of the indicator of collective labor rights constructed based on Kucera’s (2002) 
approach. They find that the flows and stock of inward FDI (as the shares in a country’s 
GDP) improves the FACB rights in the country, while more openness to trade 
(measured as trade ratio to GDP) deteriorates the rights. Davies and Vadlamannati 
(2013) also use this FACB-right data by Mosley and Uno and find that the FACB rights 
in a country are correlated with the rights in its neighboring countries, which they 
interpret as an indication of a downward pressure on the FACB rights due to 
international competition.
1
 In addition to these studies focusing on the FACB rights, the 
study by Olney (2013) uses the OECD’s indicator of the strictness of employment 
protection and finds evidence for a possibility that countries are competing in relaxing 
employment-protection regulation to attract inward FDI.  
In contrasts, the literature is slim on the second of the two questions presented 
above. There are a small number of theoretical pieces that present skepticism about the 
effectiveness or appropriateness of trade sanctions against possible deterioration in 
domestic labor standards or non-compliance practices. The empirical literature has been 
even thinner, and I was not able to find other empirical than my own earlier work 
                                                 
1
 Davies and Vadlamannati conjecture that this intra-regional correlation in the FACB rights 
may be due to “races to the bottom” in labor standards (they indeed use this phrase in the title of 
the paper), but they do not test the conjecture at all.  
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(Kamata, 2014) until recently. (See Brown et al., 2011, and Kamata, 2014 for a more 
detailed review of the literature up to the earlier 2010s.) However, more recently have 
arisen some empirical studies that examine the effects of labor provisions in trade 
agreements on domestic labor standards, mainly by researchers affiliated with the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) such as ILO (2016, 2017) and Sari et al. 
(2016). Sari et al. (2016) should be especially noted since they investigate what types of 
labor provisions are effective to maintain or improve the FACB rights in signatory 
countries using a very careful and detailed classification of RTAs.
2
  
The purpose of the current study is to address the second question of the two 
mentioned above: that is, whether labor clauses in RTAs are effective to prevent the 
domestic labor standards in RTA signatory countries from deterioration. For my 
macro-level empirical analysis, it is important to find a labor-standard measure for 
which data are available for a wide variety of countries for multiple years. I thus employ 
the following two measures of domestic labor standards: statutory minimum wages and 
the strictness indicator of employment protection, since these should be, at least to date, 
only labor-standard measures for which international data are readily available in a 
comparable form in both cross-country and time-series dimensions. The impacts of RTA 
with and without labor clauses as well as the trade presence of the RTA partners for a 
signatory are estimated using the RTA classification proposed in my own previous study 
(Kamata, 2016) together with data on minimum wages and the indicator of the strictness 
of employment protection for a wide variety of countries for multiple years. The results 
show that having labor-clause-non-inclusive RTAs with more or larger trading partners 
are associated with lower statutory minimum wages although that negative association 
is not found for labor-clause-inclusive RTAs. The separate estimation for countries in 
different income groups further demonstrates that the above-mentioned results are 
chiefly driven by middle-income countries that sign RTAs with high-income partners. 
This should imply that signing RTAs with more or larger high-income trading partners 
would create to the government of a middle-income country, which has a comparative 
advantage over the high-income partners in labor-intensive sectors, a downward policy 
pressure on statutory minimum wages, while labor clauses could alleviate such a 
negative policy effect of RTAs on minimum wages in the middle-income country. This 
finding also exhibits an interesting contrast with the empirical finding of my preceding 
study in which no systematic relationship has been found between RTA-partner trade 
                                                 
2
 It is unfortunate that they do not present the catalogue of their RTA labor-clause classification, 
which should be worth comparing with the catalogue that I have proposed (Kamata, 2016).  
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concentration and actual labor earnings regardless of whether or not RTAs include labor 
provisions. This potentially asymmetric effects of RTA labor clauses on statutory 
minimum wages and actually-paid wages are confirmed through the estimation with a 
“common” sample, which should suggest that although signing RTAs with more or 
larger partners would not bring a market pressure on wages regardless of whether or not 
the RTAs have labor clauses, signing RTAs with more or larger partners could create 
some policy pressure onto the signatory government to maintain statutory minimum 
wages being low, unless the RTAs include labor clauses. Unlike this case of statutory 
minimum wages, however, the empirical analysis finds no evidence for positive impacts 
of labor-clause-inclusive RTAs or negative impacts of labor-clause-free RTAs on the 
strictness of employment-protection regulations in the signatory countries.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: the next section 2 describes the 
empirical approach and data used for the analysis, followed by section 3 that presents 
the results of the empirical analysis. The final section 4 concludes the paper with 
discussion of possible extension of the current study.  
 
 
2 Empirical Approach and Data for the Analysis of the Impacts of 
RTA Labor Clauses on Labor Standards 
 
To empirically analyze the effects of RTA labor provisions on the domestic labor 
standards in the RTA member countries, I employ two types of empirical specification, 
or models, following my own previous work (Kamata, 2016). The first “benchmark” 
empirical model is to investigate whether and to what degree signing 
labor-clause-inclusive RTAs with a country’s trading partners affects the country’s 
domestic labor standards, compared to the case of signing RTAs without labor 
provisions. The second and alternative model focuses on the potential impacts of the 
first RTA with labor clauses for a country on its domestic labor standards. 
 
2.1  Empirical Models 
 
2.1.1 Benchmark Model for Impacts of RTAs with vs. without Labor Clauses 
The benchmark empirical model is constructed under the assumption that a country’s 
domestic labor standards will be higher or stricter as the country signs a 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA(s) with more trading partners or with a larger and thus more 
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commercially important trading partner(s) for the country, or that although signing a 
labor-clause-non-inclusive RTA(s) with more and/or larger trading partners will 
deteriorate the country’s domestic labor standards, such negative impacts of RTAs will 
be alleviated when the RTAs include labor clauses. The benchmark model is expressed 
as the following equation:  
 LSit = α + β1TC
LC
i, t-a + β2TC
NL
i, t-a + Xitγ + ui + Ttδ + εit  (1) 
LSit on the left side of this Equation (1) expresses the domestic labor standards in 
country i at time (year) t. As described in the later subsection 2.2.1, two measures for 
LSit are employed in the current study: statutory minimum wages and the strictness of 
employment protection.  
Among the variables on the right side of Equation (1), the first two variables 
TC
LC
it and TC
NL
it are the key variables: TC
LC
it is an indicator of country i’s trade 
concentration with partner countries with which the country i signs a RTA(s) with labor 
clauses; and TC
NL
it is the trade-concentration indicator with the partners of a RTA(s) 
without labor clauses. The construction of these indicators will be described in the 
subsection 2.2.2 below. The two TC indicators are lagged by a years, varying lag-year a 
from one through four, to capture a potential time lag in the impacts of signing RTA 
labor clauses on the country’s domestic labor clauses.  
The vector Xit on the right side of Equation (1) contains other control variables 
for country i at time t that are potentially influential on the domestic labor standards in 
the country. In the current study, the vector contains the following variables: the natural 
log of real GDP per capita and its square, assuming that a country’s income level will 
push up the country’s statutory minimum wage but its marginal effect is diminishing; 
employment in the industry sector as the share in the country’s total employment; 
manufacturing value added as the share in the country’s GDP; and indexes indicating 
overall political-right and civil-liberty conditions in the country. In addition, ui indicates 
country dummies representing country-specific and time-invariant factors, and Tt 
indicates time (year) dummies representing time-specific factors that are common 
across countries, to capture potential factors that affect country i’s labor conditions but 
are not observable for researchers. Finally, εit represents the idiosyncratic error term.  
 
2.1.2 Alternative Specification for Impacts of the First RTA with Labor Clauses 
The second model is to particularly analyze the impacts of the first 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA for a country on the country’s domestic labor standards. It 
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could be the very first RTA with labor clauses for a country that is really influential on 
the country’s domestic labor standards, and signing more labor-clause-inclusive RTAs 
with other partners might not give or add to the signatory country crucial incentive to 
adjust its domestic labor standards after being pressured by the first 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA to comply. To capture this potential impact of the first RTA 
with labor clauses, the alternative empirical model is constructed as expressed as 
Equation (2) below:  
LSit = α + ∑s∈{1,2,3,4+}{β1,s Di,t-s + β2,s (Di,t-s∙xsharei)} + Xitγ + ui + Ttδ + εit (2) 
As in the preceding Equation (1), the left-side variable LSit is a measure of country i’s 
domestic labor standards. Di,t-s on the right-side of the equation is indicator variables 
expressing when country i signed the first labor-clause-inclusive RTA for the country, in 
terms of how many years (s =1, 2, 3, or 4+) prior to the current data year t. That is, Di,t-1 
= 1 if country i signed its first labor-clause-inclusive RTA one year before t (and = 0 
otherwise); Di,t-2 = 1 if the country signed in two previous years, Di,t-3 = 1 if in three 
previous years, and Di,t-4+ = 1 if the country signed its first labor-clause-inclusive RTA 
four or more years earlier. The variable xsharei indicates the share of the partner(s) of 
that first labor-clause-inclusive RTA for country i in the country’s total manufacturing 
exports as of the initial year of that RTA into force.
3
 Therefore, the product term of Dit 
and xsharei is to capture the potential impact of the size of the first 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA partner: the compliance pressure on the signatory country to 
adjust to the domestic labor standards would be greater as the partner of the first RTA is 
larger and thus more important as an export market for the signatory country.  
 
2.2  Data 
 
2.2.1 Labor-standard Measures: Statutory Minimum Wages and the Strictness of 
Employment Protection 
The key variable for the empirical analysis in the current study is the domestic labor 
standards (LSit) as the dependent variable in both empirical models Equations (1) and 
(2). For the purpose of the current study, it is important to find and employ the measures 
of labor standards for which time-series data for as a wide variety of countries as 
                                                 
3
 The export share of the RTA partner(s) as of the year 1995 is applied when the first 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA became into force in 1994 or earlier, since trade data are available 
only for 1995 or later years.  
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possible. Although such multi-country and multi-period data on labor standards are not 
very widely and readily available, I employ the following two measures for which 
time-series information for multiple countries are available: statutory minimum wages 
and the indicator of the strictness of employment protection.  
Data on statutory minimum wages are obtained from ILOSTAT, an on-line 
database provided by the ILO.
4
 The ILOSTAT reports data on statutory nominal gross 
monthly minimum wage effective as of December 31 of each data period for 139 
countries and for the years 1995 through 2013 (data are not available for every year for 
all countries, however). From this ILOSTAT information, I employ and compute three 
versions of statutory monthly minimum wage measures. The first is the nominal 
minimum wage in local currency, which is identical to the data provided in the ILOSTAT. 
This is the primary measure of minimum wages in the current study, as the governments 
set statutory minimum wages basically as nominal values in their local currencies. The 
second measure is the real minimum wage in local currency, which is converted from 
the ILO-reported nominal value using the GDP deflator of each country obtained from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.5 This measure is to see changes in 
inflation-adjusted minimum wages since governments may have been adjusting the 
statutory minimum wages to inflation. The third measure is statutory monthly minimum 
wage in the constant 2005 US dollar (i.e., real dollar-denominated minimum wage), 
which is converted from the ILO’s original nominal local-currency value using the 
current market exchange rate and US GDP deflator (base year 2005) that are also 
obtained from the World Development Indicators.  
For the strictness of employment protection, I employ data from the OECD’s 
Employment Protection Database.
6
 The OECD database provides summary indicators 
of employment protection that are constructed from the quantitative and qualitative 
evaluations of the employment protection regulations for the strictness of regulation on 
dismissals and use of temporary contracts. The regulations of each country are assessed 
from a variety of aspects to construct the summary indicators. The data are primarily for 
OECD members but also cover some non-OECD countries. The virtue of this data is 
that they cover long time periods from the years 1985 through 2015. From this OECD 
data I particularly employ their “version 1” summary indicator that measures the 
strictness of regulations of individual dismissal of employees on regular or indefinite 
                                                 
4
 http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/  
5
 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators  
6
 http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm  
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contracts (EPR_V1).  
 
2.2.2 RTAs with vs. without Labor Clauses and the Construction of RTA-partner 
Trade-concentration Indexes 
The two trade-concentration indexes in the benchmark model Equation (1), TC
LC
it and 
TC
NL
it, are constructed as follows: 
TC
LC
it = ∑j
N
(RTA
LC
ijt × TradeShareij,1995)  for i ≠ j 
TC
NL
it = ∑j
N
(RTA
NL
ijt × TradeShareij,1995)  for i ≠ j 
RTA
LC
ijt and RTA
NL
ijt are dummy variables that take the value one if countries i and j are 
both members of a common RTA(s) with and without labor clauses as of year t, 
respectively; and TradeShareij is the volume of manufacturing trade (imports plus 
exports) between countries i and j as the share in country i’s total manufacturing trade 
with all other countries in the world. Thus, TC
LC
it (TC
NL
it) takes a larger value as country 
i signs more RTAs with (without) labor clauses, or signs a labor-clause-(non-)inclusive 
RTA(s) with a larger trading partner(s). On constructing these indexes, I use the fixed 
share of RTA partner(s) in each country’s total manufacturing trade as of the year 1995 
(TradeShareij,1995), which is the earliest period in the data used for the current study. 
This is to address an issue of possible endogeneity between signing an RTA and trade 
share of the RTA partner(s) (for instance, TC
LC
it could take a larger value when country 
i’s trade with the partner of a previously-signed labor-clause-inclusive RTA increased, 
even though country i did not sign an additional labor-clause-inclusive RTA with other 
partner), and to examine the impact of the size of RTA partners at or prior to the signing 
of the RTA. However, I also construct and use for estimation the trade-concentration 
indexes based on the current-year RTA-partner trade share to see whether any difference 
appears in the result. Data on bilateral manufacturing trade flows that are used to 
compute the trade share of RTA partners for each country are obtained from the 
UNCTADstat, an on-line database provided by the UNCTAD.
7
  
 To construct these RTA trade-concentration indexes, also is needed the 
information on bilateral (and plurilateral) RTAs and whether those RTAs do or do not 
include labor provisions. I use the catalogue and classification of RTAs that have been 
made through my other studies (Kamata, 2014 and 2016). The catalogue covers 223 
bilateral or plurilateral RTAs (excluding the Generalized System of Preferences of 
                                                 
7
 http://unctadstat.unctad.org/  
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GSPs) that have been in force and notified to the WTO as of the end of June 2013.
8
 
These RTAs varies in terms of whether the RTAs include any provision mentioning 
labor standards or worker rights as well as to what degree those standards and/or rights 
are ruled or mentioned. I thus selected RTAs that satisfy the following two conditions 
and defined them as “RTAs with labor clauses” (or labor-clause-inclusive RTAs) and all 
else as “RTAs without labor clauses” (or labor-clause-non-inclusive RTAs): (i) the RTA 
has provisions that demand, urge, or at least expect the signatory countries to harmonize 
their domestic labor conditions and regulations with the internationally recognized 
standards such as the ILO’s “core” standards or an equivalent set of labor standards, and 
(ii) the RTA has an extensive set(s) of articles that stipulates the items/issues for which 
the signatory countries shall cooperate and the procedures for consultations and/or 
dispute settlement on issues concerning labor conditions, as a part (chapter(s) or title(s)) 
of the main body of the RTA or a separate side agreement or MOU. For 
robustness-check purposes, I also consider the condition (ii) only as another definition 
of “RTAs with labor clauses” and call it the ‘liberal’ definition/classification of 
labor-clause-inclusive RTAs. In contrast, I call the benchmark definition with the two 
conditions (i) and (ii) the ‘conservative’ definition/classification. There are 22 
labor-clause-inclusive RTAs under the conservative classification, while 31 are defined 
as labor-clause-inclusive RTAs under the liberal classification, as listed in Table 1.  
 
2.2.3 Data for Other Control Variables 
Data for other control variables contained in vector Xit in both Equations (1) and (2) are 
obtained as follows. For the linear and square terms of the (log-scaled) real income, 
GDP per capita in constant 2005 US dollars from the World Development Indicators is 
employed. Data for both employment in the industry sector as the share in the total 
employment and manufacturing value-added as the share in GDP are also taken from 
the World Development Indicators and computed as the percent values. The indexes of 
political rights and civil liberties are sourced from the Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World. The indexes are scaled from 1 through 7, and a smaller number indicates a 
higher degree of freedom. The data for the current paper are obtained from an on-line 
database provided by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
                                                 
8
 There are 259 RTAs that have been in force and notified to the WTO as of the end of June 
2013, but I have been able to find the texts of only 223 of those RTAs to examine the existence 
and contents of their labor provisions or worker-right-related provisions.  
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(International IDEA).
9
 
 
2.2.4 Constructed Dataset for Empirical Analysis 
The dataset for the empirical analysis is constructed by combining the various data from 
different sources that have been described above. The constructed dataset covers 106 
countries for the years 1995 through 2011 (but the observation periods are from only 
1996 through 2011, since the earliest-period data for 1995 are used as lagged variables 
for the period of year 1996 or later). Table 2 lists the countries covered by the dataset, 
and Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the dependent variables (labor-standard 
measures) of the two empirical models, RTA trade-concentration indexes in the 
benchmark model, and other control variables in both models, contained in the dataset.  
 
 
3 Estimation Results 
 
3.1  Effects of RTA Trade on Labor Standards: Results of Estimation of 
Benchmark Model 
 
3.1.1 Estimation with the Whole Sample 
First, the benchmark empirical model Equation (1) is estimated using the fixed-effect 
regression. The results of the estimation are presented in Table 4. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust (clustered) standard errors of the coefficient estimates.  
Statutory Minimum Wages 
The second through thirteenth columns show the results of estimation for the 
three measures of statutory minimum wages. The first four of these 12 columns are for 
the local-currency nominal, the next four are for the local-currency real, and the last 
four are for the constant US-dollar versions of the minimum wages. In each group of 
four columns, the first column shows the result of the estimation with one-year-lagged 
                                                 
9
 http://www.idea.int/. The Freedom House conducts the evaluation and rating for a country with 
an interval of a few to several years, and thus for each country there exist “non-surveyed years” 
for which updated indexes are not available. For these non-surveyed years, I have filled in the 
data in the following manner: the non-surveyed years are basically filled in with the indexes for 
the previous survey year; but the data in non-surveyed years are kept unfilled/missing when (i) 
the survey interval is significantly long, (ii) the scores/ratings are very different between the two 
survey years, or (iii) it is somewhat obvious that human-right condition of a country was affected 
by a significant political event that occurred in that country during a survey-interval period . 
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RTA trade-concentration indexes (TCs), the second shows the estimation with 
two-year-lagged TCs, the third is with three-year-lagged TCs, and the fourth is the 
estimation result with four-year-lagged TCs. The table shows a clear picture in the 
estimation result for any of the three minimum-wage measures: basically for any of the 
one- through four-year-lagged variables, the coefficient estimate on the 
trade-concentration index for RTAs without labor clauses (TC
NL
) is negative and 
statistically significant.
10
 This could be interpreted as that a country tends to lower its 
statutory minimum wage as the country has signed a labor-clause-non-inclusive RTA(s) 
with more and/or larger trading partners. The coefficient estimates indicate that, on 
average, as a country’s trade concentration with a partner(s) of labor-clause-free RTA 
increases by 1% (by signing a RTA with a new partner(s) or with a larger partner), the 
statutory minimum wage in that country will fall by about 0.8% in the nominal value or 
0.5% in the real term. In contrast, the coefficient estimate  on the 
trade-concentration index for RTAs with labor clauses (TC
LC
) is neither significantly 
positive nor negative in most of the cases, except for the cases of the real minimum 
wages in local currency (the 9
th
 column) and US dollar (the 13
th
 column) where the 
4-year-lagged TC
LC
 indicates a positive and significant effect on the minimum wage. 
These results should suggest that labor clauses could at least null/cancel the potential 
negative impact of labor-clause-free RTAs on statutory minimum wages.  
Statutory Minimum Wages vs. Actual Wages 
The estimation result provided above demonstrates an interesting contrast with 
the empirical finding in my own other work (Kamata, 2016) in which no evidence have 
been found for positive or negative impacts of RTAs with or without labor clauses on 
actual wages (labor earnings). To confirm this potential asymmetric impacts of RTAs 
with and without labor clauses, I estimate the benchmark model for actual wages, and 
also (re-)estimate Equation (1) for the three measures of statutory minimum wages 
(measured in local currency nominal, local currency real, and US dollar real), using a 
“common” sample comprising observations for which data for both actual wages and 
statutory minimum wages are available. The data for (the log of) actual wages are 
sourced from LABORSTA,
11
 another on-line database by the ILO, and I take the 
reported values of the mean monthly earnings of manufacturing workers in the nominal 
                                                 
10
 The only exception is the 4-year-lagged TC
NL
 for the local-currency nominal value of the 
minimum wage. Although the sign of the coefficient estimate is negative as in all other 
estimation, it is not statistically significant.  
11
 http://laborsta.ilo.org/  
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local currency unit and covert them to the real values in constant 2005 US dollars using 
the current market exchange rates (annual average) and the US GDP deflator reported in 
the World Development Indicators. As Table A1 presents, the findings are indeed 
(re-)confirmed through the estimation with the common sample. As shown in the last 
twelve columns of the table, the coefficient estimate on the trade-concentration index 
for labor-clause-free RTAs (TC
NL
) is negative and statistically significant for virtually 
all cases, and that on the index for labor-clause-inclusive RTAs (TC
LC
) is insignificant 
for any case. The sizes of these coefficient estimates are also very similar to those in 
Table 4. In contrast, the estimation for the actual wage gives no positive or negative 
significant coefficient estimates as shown in the second through fifth column of Table 
A1, implying that signing RTAs with more and/or larger partners would not have 
significant impacts on actually-paid wages. These empirical results overall may imply 
that (i) signing RTAs with more or larger partners would not bring a market pressure on 
wages regardless of whether or not the RTAs have labor clauses; but that (ii) signing 
labor-clause-free RTAs with more/larger partners might create some policy pressure 
onto the signatory government to maintain statutory minimum wages being low; while 
(iii) labor clauses in RTAs could alleviate such downward policy pressure on minimum 
wages created by RTAs.  
Strictness of Employment Protection 
The last four columns of Table 4 present the result of estimation of the 
benchmark Equation (1) for the OECD indicator of the strictness of employment 
protection. Unlike the case of the statutory minimum wages, the estimation shows no 
evidence for the positive or negative impacts of RTA trade on employment protection in 
terms of dismissal regulations, regardless of whether the RTA has labor clauses or not: 
the coefficient estimate on neither TC
LC
 nor TC
NL
 is statistically significant with any lag. 
A possible reason for the suggested no impacts of RTA labor clauses on the strictness of 
employment protection might be due to the fact that most labor clauses deal with the 
core labor standards such as child-labor prohibition and the FACB rights of workers or 
“decent work” in terms of wages and work hours, but do not directly deal with the 
employment protection regulations. Alternatively, it might be merely due to technical 
issues in estimation such as that the sample for employment-protection estimation 
concentrates on the OECD members and includes few non-OECD countries.  
Notes on Other Control Variables 
Finally, I put some comments on the estimation results on other control 
 13 
variables. First, although the estimation shows that a country’s income level is 
associated with the country’s statutory minimum wage in the nominal local-currency 
value, this positive association is not significant when the minimum wage is measured 
in real values.  
Secondly, the estimation for the employment-protection index gives a negative 
and significant coefficient on the civil-liberty index, which should understandably 
indicate that more civil freedom is associated with stricter labor protection. However, 
the estimated coefficient on the political-right index is positive and significant, which 
should counter-intuitively indicate that a lower degree of political rights is associated 
with stricter employment protection.
12
 Although a possible reason for this puzzle 
should be worth examining, I leave it to future investigation to focus on the main theme 
of the current study: the impacts of RTA labor clauses.  
 
3.1.2 Estimation with Samples Separated in terms of Country Income Groups 
The policy effects of RTA labor clauses on the domestic labor standards can be different 
for countries in different income levels. For instance, labor clauses might not be so 
important when an RTA is signed between high-income countries that both have high 
labor standards, but labor clauses might be effective when an RTA is signed between a 
high-income country with high labor standards and a lower-income country with weaker 
labor standards. The estimation with the whole sample presented above can hardly 
capture such difference.  
To analyze the potential difference in the impacts of RTA labor clauses for 
countries in different income levels, I extend the benchmark model and estimate it with 
separated samples for countries in different income groups. More specifically, the 
original Equation (1) is modified to the following Equation (1e):  
LSit = α + ∑g∈{H,M,L} (β1,g TC
LC,g
i, t-a + β2,g TC
NL,g
i, t-a) + Xitγ + ui + Ttδ + εit (1e) 
The partner-income-separated TC indexes are constructed as follows: 
TC
LC,g
it = ∑j
N
(RTA
LC
ijt × TradeShareij,1995 × I
g
j)  for i ≠ j 
TC
NL,g
it = ∑j
N
(RTA
NL
ijt × TradeShareij,1995 × I
g
j)  for i ≠ j 
Index g = {H, I, L} indicates the income group of each country: H represents 
high-income, M represents middle-income, and L represents low-income country groups, 
                                                 
12
 As mentioned earlier, the Freedom House’s political-right and civil-liberty indexes are scaled 
in a way that a smaller score means greater freedom.  
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respectively. The country income groups are classified according to the World Bank’s 
classification based on gross national income (GNI) per capita as of the year 1995: the 
country is high-income if its 1995 GNI per capita is $9,386 or above, middle-income if 
between $766 and $9,385, or low-income if $765 or below. The indexes I
g
j indicate the 
income categories of the RTA partners for each country i: I
H
j = 1 when the country’s 
RTA partner j is high-income (and = 0 otherwise), I
M
j = 1 when the RTA partner j is 
middle-income, and I
L
j = 1 when the RTA partner j is low-income. Equation (1e) thus 
includes six trade-concentration (TC) indexes: a pair of TC
LC
 and TC
NL
 for three income 
groups (high, middle, and low) of the RTA partners of each country i. This extended 
empirical model is separately estimated for three subgroups of the sample countries 
separated in terms of the income groups (high, middle, and low).  
The estimation results of the extended model are presented in Tables 5 through 
7: Table 5 shows the results for high-income countries, Table 6 shows the results for 
middle-income countries, and Table 7 shows the results for low-income countries. These 
results suggest an overall finding that the negative and significant impact of signing 
labor-clause-non-inclusive RTAs with more and/or larger trading partners on statutory 
minimum wages as well as labor clauses’ “nulling” or canceling effect against this 
negative RTA impact, which have been found through the whole-sample estimation, 
should mainly be driven by middle-income countries that sign RTAs with high-income 
partners (see Table 6, the first 8 rows for “High-income RTA partners”). For other cases 
such as high-middle or middle-middle country pairs, the estimated coefficients on the 
two RTA-trade-concentration indexes are mostly statistically insignificant or not 
consistent across the measurement units of the minimum wages. However, it should be 
noted that the estimation also gives a negative and significant coefficient on the TC 
index for labor-clause-inclusive RTAs consistently for high income countries with 
high-income partners (and for some cases with middle-income partners) for the real 
minimum wages (see the 6
th
 through 13
th
 columns of Table 5). Observing that many of 
the RTA with labor clauses are between high-income countries, this result might imply 
the possibility that in high-income countries, signing RTAs with more and/or larger 
trading partners creates a negative pressure on statutory minimum wages in the real 
term despite labor clauses in the RTAs, perhaps in a “passive” manner that the minimum 
wages are nominally maintained unrisen.
13
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 The estimation also gives some significant coefficients on the TC indexes estimates for 
low-income countries, while the reliability of these estimates should be skeptical due to a 
limited-sample issue: among the RTAs dealt with in the current study, only one 
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From this set of the results of the pairwisely-income-separated estimation, we 
might be able to derive a finer picture about what the set of empirical findings based on 
the benchmark model imply: Signing RTAs with more and/or larger high-income 
trading partners would create to the governments of middle-income countries, which 
have a comparative advantage over the high-income partners in labor-intensive sectors, 
a downward policy pressure on statutory minimum wages, while labor clauses could 
alleviate such a negative policy effect of RTAs on minimum wages in middle-income 
countries.  
In terms of the impacts on the strictness of employment protection, the results 
presented in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the result of no evidence for positive or 
negative effects of RTAs on employment-protection strictness in the whole-sample 
estimation may be common for countries in different income groups.
14
 It should 
however be noted that, for the case of RTAs between high-income countries, the 
estimated coefficient on the TC index for labor-clause-inclusive RTAs is negative and 
significant (while the coefficient on the index for labor-clause-free RTATs is 
insignificant), as shown in the last four columns of Table 5. This is similar to the 
above-mentioned finding for real minim wages, and a similar possibility might thus be 
implied: i.e., in high-income countries, signing RTAs with more and/or larger trading 
partners creates a negative pressure, despite labor clauses in the RTAs, on 
employment-protection regulations perhaps in a passive manner that the regulations are 
maintained untighten. At the same time, the estimation also shows that the coefficient 
on the TC
LC
 index is less negative and less significant with a longer lag, and this might 
imply that RTA labor clauses could have an improving effect on the strictness of 
employment protection slowly, reflecting time required for the governments to adjust 
the regulations to comply with the signed RTA labor clauses.  
 
3.1.3 Estimation with Alternative Measures for RTA Trade-concentration Indexes 
Finally, I estimate the benchmark model with the whole sample but using two different 
measures of the RTA trade-concentration indexes (TC
LC
 and TC
NL
) to examine whether 
                                                                                                                                               
labor-clause-inclusive RTA (CAFTA-DR) involves low-income countries (or, if following the 
‘liberal’ RTA classification, four more labor-clause-inclusive RTAs involve low-income 
countries: CARICOM (2002 revised), EU-CARIFORUM States, New Zealand-China, and 
Nicaragua-Taiwan). 
14
 As indicated in the last four columns of Table 7, the sample for the current study includes no 
low-income-country observations valid for the estimation for the strictness of employment 
protection.  
 16 
the construction of the TC indexes affects the estimation results.  
First, I re-construct the TC indexes based on the ‘liberal’ definition of RTAs 
with labor clauses instead of the ‘conservative’ definition that has been employed 
originally, in order to see whether the definition of a labor-clause-inclusive RTA matters 
to the results of estimation. As described in a previous subsection 2.2.2 and shown in 
Table 1, the ‘conservative’ definition classifies 22 RTAs as labor-clause-inclusive RTAs 
while the ‘liberal’ definition adds nine other RTAs and classifies 31 as RTAs with labor 
clauses. The two RTA-trade-concentration indexes are re-computed accordingly and 
used to re-estimate Equation (1). The results are as presented in Table A2, and these 
results are almost exactly identical to the results of the original estimation presented in 
Table 4. The estimation results are not sensitive to the definition of 
labor-clause-inclusive RTAs, and thus the empirical findings presented earlier in 
subsection 3.1.1 should be robust to the classification of RTAs with labor clauses.  
Secondly, I re-construct the TC indexes using the current-year share of RTA 
partners in a country’s total manufacturing trade, instead of the fixed share as of the year 
1995 originally employed. The TC indexes are thus re-computed in the following 
manner (notice that the time script on TradeShare is now t, instead of the original 
“1995”):  
TC
LC
it = ∑j
N
(RTA
LC
ijt × TradeShareijt)  for i ≠ j 
TC
NL
it = ∑j
N
(RTA
NL
ijt × TradeShareijt)  for i ≠ j 
The benchmark model Equation (1) is re-estimated using this alternative version of TC 
indexes, and the results are presented in Table A3. The results are not qualitatively 
different from those of the original estimation shown in Table 4, the statistical 
significance of the negative coefficient estimate on the index for 
labor-clause-non-inclusive RTAs (TC
NL
it) is now weaker, particularly for the real values 
of statutory minimum wages. As mentioned earlier in subsection 2.2.2, this alternative 
version of the TC indexes can pick up the effect of post-RTA growth in trade with the 
RTA partners. Thus, the results of the original estimation (Table 4) and this 
re-estimation with the alternative TC measures (Table A3) together imply that what is 
crucial for the potential negative impact of labor-clause-free RTAs on a signatory’s 
minimum wages is may be the pre-signing size or importance of the RTA partners (as 
well as the number of signed RTAs and partners), and the negative policy pressure on 
minimum wages may not be intensified even though the significance of the partners of 
the already-signed RTAs increases. The results might rather suggest a possibility that 
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post-RTA growth in trade with the RTA partners could improve the minimum wages in 
the real term, which could mitigate the initial negative impact of signing a 
labor-clause-free RTA on the nominal (and real) minimum wages.  
 
3.2 Results of the Estimation of the Second Model 
 
The estimation is also performed for the second empirical model expressed as Equation 
(2) that focuses on the importance of the first labor-clause-inclusive RTA for a country. 
Table 8 presents the results of the estimation through the fixed-effect regression. As in 
the previous tables, numbers in parentheses indicate the robust (clustered) standard 
errors of corresponding coefficient estimates.  
The results of estimation for statutory minimum wages are shown in the second 
through fourth columns of the table. The estimated coefficient on the dummies 
indicating the timing of signing the first labor-clause-inclusive RTA (Dt-1 through Dt-4+) 
are statistically insignificant for any measure of minimum wage or for any year dummy. 
On the other hand, the estimated coefficient on the product term of the first-RTA 
dummy and the size of the first-RTA partner(s) as the share in the country’s total 
manufacturing export is positive and significant consistently in almost all cases. This 
result might suggest that the first labor-clause-inclusive RTA for a country could have a 
positive effect on the country’s minimum wages only when that first RTA is signed with 
a large-market trading partner. In other words, the first labor-clause-inclusive RTA 
would not be very influential on the country’s minimum wages when the RTA is signed 
with a small partner or minor export market for the country. Finally, the result of the 
estimation for the strictness of employment protection that is shown in the last column 
of the table provides no evidence for the impacts of the first labor-clause-inclusive RTA 
on the signatory’s employment-protection regulations, which is consistent with the 
estimation result of the benchmark model that has found no evidence for the effects of 
RTAs with (and without) labor clauses on the employment protection strictness.  
The impacts of the first labor-clause-inclusive RTA on a country’s domestic 
labor standards can differ across countries with different income levels. To analyze this 
potential difference, the second empirical model is also estimated with subsamples for 
high-income countries and middle-income countries.
15,16
 The estimation results for 
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 The estimation results are not presented for low-income countries, as the current dataset 
contains no low-income-country observations valid for the estimation of the second model.  
16
 For this second model, the sample is separated only in terms of the country’s income levels 
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high-income countries are presented in Table 9 and those for middle-income countries 
are shown in Table 10. These two tables show that the above-mentioned results of the 
estimation with the whole sample for statutory minimum wages (i.e., insignificant 
coefficients on the timing dummies and positive and significant coefficients on the 
product terms of the dummies and the size of the RTA partner) should be driven by the 
high-income countries in the sample as shown in Table 9,
17
 and Table 10 indicates that 
virtually none of the coefficient estimates is significant for the middle-income countries. 
At the same time, these results might indicate other possibility on the interpretation of 
the empirical findings through the second model, which might be due to reversed 
causality: i.e., a high-income country whose statutory minimum wage is originally 
high(er) is less hesitant or more willing to sign a labor-clause-inclusive RTA even with a 
partner with large(r) market.
18
  
As an overall message from these results of the estimation of the second 
empirical model, it should be fair to conservatively conclude that having one 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA by itself may not have significant impacts on the signatory’s 
statutory minimum wages or employment-protection regulations, and that it is not 
necessarily the first RTA with labor clauses that could influence on these labor standards 
in the signatory country.  
 
 
4 Conclusion and Discussion  
  
The current study has addressed the question of whether labor clauses in regional trade 
agreements or RTAs are effective to maintain or improve the domestic labor standards 
in the signatory countries. This study has empirically analyzed the effects of RTA labor 
clauses on two measures of the signatories’ domestic labor standards: statutory 
minimum wages and the strictness of employment protection. The impacts of RTA with 
                                                                                                                                               
but not for the partners’, unlike the case for the benchmark model.  
17
 For the minimum wage in the real US-dollar value, however, no significant coefficients are 
found even in the estimation for high-income countries (see the fourth column of Table 9) 
although the coefficients on the product terms of the first-RTA dummies and the partner size are 
positive and significant in the estimation with the whole sample. This might be due to the small 
sample size (N = 85) in the high-income subsamples for the estimation.  
18
 For the employment-protection strictness, unlike the estimation with the whole sample or 
high-income subsample, the estimation with the middle-income subsample gives significant 
coefficient estimates on the first-RTA dummies (positive) and the product term of the dummies 
and the size of the first-RTA partners (negative). However, this may also be due to the small 
sample size (N = 106).  
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and without labor clauses as well as the trade presence of the RTA partners for a 
signatory have been estimated using the RTA classification proposed in my own 
previous study (Kamata, 2016) together with data on minimum wages and the indicator 
of the strictness of employment protection for a wide variety of countries for multiple 
years. The results show that having labor-clause-non-inclusive RTAs with more or 
larger trading partners are associated with lower statutory minimum wages although that 
negative association is not found for labor-clause-inclusive RTAs. The separate 
estimation for countries in different income groups further demonstrates that the 
above-mentioned results are chiefly driven by middle-income countries that sign RTAs 
with high-income partners. This should imply that signing RTAs with more or larger 
high-income trading partners would create to the government of a middle-income 
country, which has a comparative advantage over the high-income partners in 
labor-intensive sectors, a downward policy pressure on statutory minimum wages, while 
labor clauses could alleviate such a negative policy effect of RTAs on minimum wages 
in the middle-income country. This finding also exhibits an interesting contrast with the 
empirical finding of my preceding study in which no systematic relationship has been 
found between RTA-partner trade concentration and actual labor earnings regardless of 
whether or not RTAs include labor provisions. This potentially asymmetric effects of 
RTA labor clauses on statutory minimum wages and actually-paid wages have been 
reaffirmed through the estimation with a “common” sample, which should suggest that 
although signing RTAs with more or larger partners would not bring a market pressure 
on wages regardless of whether or not the RTAs have labor clauses, signing RTAs with 
more or larger partners could create some policy pressure onto the signatory 
government to maintain statutory minimum wages being low, unless the RTAs include 
labor clauses. Unlike this case of statutory minimum wages, however, the empirical 
analysis has found no evidence for positive impacts of labor-clause-inclusive RTAs or 
negative impacts of labor-clause-free RTAs on the strictness of employment-protection 
regulations in the signatory countries. It should also be noted that the empirical analysis 
has found some evidence for potential negative effects of RTAs between high-income 
countries on their domestic labor standards even in the case of RTAs with labor clauses.  
To conclude the current paper, I discuss what could be done for further 
investigation of the current research question. One is to estimate the impacts of RTA 
labor clauses on the FACB rights of workers. As mentioned in the introductory section 
of this paper, some recent studies have pointed out a possibility of “races to the bottom” 
in the FACB rights of workers due to globalization, or a possible negative impact of 
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growing international trade or foreign direct investment on workers’ FACB rights. It 
should thus be valuable to extend the current empirical approach to investigate whether 
RTA labor clauses could prevent the possible deterioration of the FACB rights, which 
are included in the internationally recognized core labor standards to which a number of 
RTAs refer in their labor provisions. Another is to perform more detailed investigation 
of the function of RTA labor provisions in affecting the domestic labor standards in the 
signatory countries. This might be an important theme to explore, as Sari et al. (2016) 
points out that the effectiveness of RTA labor clauses could be different by the types of 
the provision. Considering restriction and difficulty in obtaining macro-level data for 
this theme, however, one feasible and hopefully promising approach could be a case 
study of a particular RTA with labor clauses that has relatively a long history, such as 
the NAFTA.  
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Table 1.  List of Regional Trade Agreements with Labor Clauses 
(RTAs with * are included only according to the liberal classification.) 
 
USA-Australia 
USA-Bahrain  
USA-Chile  
USA-Colombia 
USA-Jordan 
USA- Korea (South) 
USA-Morocco  
USA-Oman 
USA-Panama 
USA-Peru 
USA-Singapore  
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
USA-CAFTA-Dominican Republic 
(CAFTA-DR) 
Canada-Chile 
Canada-Colombia 
Canada-Costa Rica  
Canada-Jordan 
Canada-Peru 
 
European Economic Area (EEA) 
EU- Korea (South) 
Chile-Turkey 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
(TPSEP or P4) 
* EFTA-Hong Kong 
* EFTA-Montenegro 
* EU-CARIFORUM States 
* Carribean Community and Common Market 
(CARICOM, 2002 revised) 
* Chile-China 
* Chile-Colombia  
* New Zealand-China 
* New Zealand-Malaysia  
* Nicaragua-Taiwan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. of RTAs with labor clauses: 
 22 according to the conservative classification 
 31 according to the liberal classification 
Notes: 
1. RTAs with labor clauses are defined as RTAs, according to the conservative classification,  
that satisfy both of the following two criteria:  
(i) The RTA has provisions that demand, urge, or at least expect the signatory countries to 
harmonize their domestic labor conditions and regulations with the internationally 
recognized standards such as the ILO’s “core” standards or an equivalent set of labor 
standards,  
(ii) the RTA has an extensive set(s) of articles that stipulates the items/issues for which the 
signatory countries shall cooperate and the procedures for consultations and/or dispute 
settlement on issues concerning labor conditions, as a part (chapter(s) or title(s)) of the 
main body of the RTA or a separate side agreement or MOU.  
RTAs with labor clauses under the liberal classification are those that satisfy the criterion (ii). 
(This classification includes the RTA with * in the list above, which satisfy (ii) but not (i).)  
2. The labor-clause-inclusive RTAs listed above are classified from the population of 223 
RTAs that had entered in force and are notified to the WTO as of July 2013. The 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) are not included in the RTA populations.  
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Table 2.  Countries in the Data for Empirical Analysis 
(106 countries)  
 
High-income Countries 
(24 countries) 
Middle-income Countries 
(52 countries) 
Low-income Countries 
(29 countries) 
Australia*  
Austria*  
Bahamas  
Belgium*  
Canada* 
Cyprus 
Denmark* 
Finland*  
France*  
Germany*  
Iceland*  
Ireland*  
Italy*  
Japan*  
Korea (South)*  
Luxemburg*  
Netherlands*  
New Zealand*  
Norway*  
Portugal*  
Spain*  
Sweden*  
United Kingdom*  
United States*  
 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil*  
Bulgaria  
Chile* 
Colombia  
Costa Rica  
Croatia  
Cuba  
Czech Republic*  
Dominican Republic  
Ecuador  
Egypt  
El Salvador  
Estonia*  
Gabon  
Guatemala 
Hungary*  
Indonesia*  
Jamaica  
Jordan  
Kazakhstan  
Latvia  
Lesotho  
Lithuania  
Macedonia 
Malta  
 
Mauritius 
Mexico*  
Moldova 
Morocco  
Panama  
Paraguay  
Peru  
Philippines  
Poland*  
Romania  
Russia*  
Slovakia*  
Slovenia*  
South Africa*  
Syria  
Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago  
Tunisia  
Turkey*  
Ukraine 
Uruguay  
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela  
 
Albania  
Armenia 
Azerbaijan  
Benin 
Bhutan 
Burkina Faso 
Cambodia 
Cameroon  
Ethiopia 
Georgia 
Ghana  
Honduras 
India*  
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan  
Mali  
Mongolia 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria  
Pakistan 
Rwanda  
Senegal  
Sri Lanka  
Tajikistan  
Tanzania  
Togo  
Uganda 
Vietnam  
Zambia  
 
(Income group N.A.) 
(1 country) 
Serbia 
 
Notes: 
1. The numbers of data years are different for different countries, ranging from 1 to 16 of the entire 
16 time points (between years 1996 and 2011, with lagged variables).  
2. Countries with asterisks (*) are those included in the data for estimation for the strictness of 
employment protection (36 countries).  
3. Income groups are based on the World Bank’s income classification as based on the country’s gross 
national income (GNI) per capita as of 1995, defined as follows: 
High income:  $9,386 or more 
Middle income:  $ 766 to $9,385 
Low income:  $ 765 or less  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Variables in Benchmark Model;  
for observations valid for the estimation 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln(monthly minimum wage 
in LCU, nominal) 
910 7.49 2.71 0.095 14.32 
ln(monthly minimum wage 
in LCU, real) 
910 7.56 2.81 0.095 13.80 
ln(monthly minimum wage 
in constant 2005 USD) 
820 4.54 1.88 -5.25 9.83 
Strictness of Employment 
Protection 
(OECD Indicator) 
430 2.25 0.814 0.26 4.58 
trade-concentration with 
LC-incl. RTA partners  
(TC
LC
it) 
1051 0.246 0.336 0 0.854 
trade-concentration with 
LC-nonincl. RTA partners  
(TC
NL
it) 
1051 0.155 0.203 0 0.892 
ln(GDP/cap) 1,072 8.73 1.40 5.00 11.38 
industry employment (%) 1,072 23.41 6.73 2.6 41.8 
manufacturing v.a. (%) 1,072 17.60 5.64 0 35.63 
political rights index 1,072 2.38 1.73 1 7 
civil liberties index 1,072 2.61 1.47 1 7 
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Table 4. Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Minimum Wages and Employment Protection 
(RTAs with labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; and RTA trade concentrations are based on the RTA partners’ 
manufacturing trade share as of 1995.) 
 
Dependent variable: Statutory Minimum Wages (log-scaled) 
Strictness of Employment Protection 
in Local Currency, Nominal in Local Currency, Real in Constant US Dollar 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
-.039 
(.122) 
   .016 
(.096) 
   .053 
(.129) 
   -.088 
(.065) 
   
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-1 
-.804*** 
(.263) 
   -.363** 
(.181) 
   -.458** 
(.213) 
   .070 
(.147) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.038 
(.121) 
   .055 
(.091) 
   .101 
(.123) 
   -.135 
(.080) 
  
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.839*** 
(.283) 
   -.469** 
(.188) 
   -.533** 
(.219) 
   .142 
(.125) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.034 
(.133) 
   .094 
(.096) 
   .183 
(.134) 
   -.119 
(.089) 
 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.802** 
(.325) 
   -.474** 
(.216) 
   -.546** 
(.265) 
   .008 
(.146) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.029 
(.118) 
   .140* 
(.081) 
   .249** 
(.125) 
   -.071 
(.065) 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.478 
(.297) 
   -.343* 
(.177) 
   -.434** 
(.219) 
   -.118 
(.136) 
ln(GDP per capita) 5.08** 
(2.18) 
5.05** 
(2.28) 
4.62** 
(2.31) 
4.20* 
(2.28) 
2.66 
(1.93) 
2.74 
(2.06) 
2.47 
(2.12) 
2.23 
(2.09) 
1.62 
(2.21) 
1.66 
(2.24) 
1.51 
(2.22) 
1.50 
(2.15) 
.040 
(2.14) 
-.100 
(1.83) 
-.348 
(1.80) 
-.823 
(1.83) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.228* 
(.124) 
-.221* 
(.129) 
-.193 
(.128) 
-.167 
(.127) 
-.070 
(.102) 
-.076 
(.108) 
-.065 
(.110) 
-.055 
(.110) 
.041 
(.127) 
.038 
(.128) 
.044 
(.127) 
.042 
(.124) 
-.005 
(.114) 
.011 
(.098) 
.023 
(.097) 
.041 
(.100) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employ.) 
-.002 
(.012) 
-.007 
(.012) 
-.005 
(.013) 
.001 
(.012) 
-.016 
(.011) 
-.017 
(.012) 
-.014 
(.012) 
-.011 
(.010) 
-.000 
(.011) 
-.002 
(.012) 
.001 
(.012) 
.005 
(.011) 
.009 
(.006) 
.005 
(.007) 
.002 
(.008) 
.004 
(.009) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.016 
(.013) 
-.011 
(.013) 
-.004 
(.011) 
-.000 
(.011) 
-.009 
(.009) 
-.003 
(.008) 
.001 
(.007) 
.002 
(.007) 
-.019** 
(.009) 
-.013 
(.008) 
-.008 
(.007) 
-.008 
(.008) 
-.010 
(.010) 
-.006 
(.009) 
-.002 
(.009) 
-.001 
(.008) 
Political rights index .039 
(.054) 
.031 
(.051) 
.031 
(.049) 
.029 
(.047) 
-.009 
(.024) 
-.016 
(.022) 
-.025 
(.021) 
-.016 
(.023) 
-.017 
(.033) 
-.022 
(.032) 
-.032 
(.034) 
-.014 
(.025) 
.081** 
(.030) 
.090*** 
(.033) 
.057 
(.044) 
.033 
(.046) 
Civil liberty index -.111 
(.079) 
-.118* 
(.066) 
-.124** 
(.057) 
-.129** 
(.055) 
-.016 
(.039) 
-.014 
(.037) 
-.006 
(.035) 
-.003 
(.034) 
-.012 
(.054) 
-.021 
(.048) 
-.022 
(.044) 
-.040 
(.044) 
-.056** 
(.026) 
-.065** 
(.025) 
-.056** 
(.024) 
-.050* 
(.025) 
No. of observations 859 829 795 757 859 829 795 757 769 739 705 667 402 378 354 329 
Adjusted R2  .988 .990 .991 .991 .994 .994 .995 .995 .983 .984 .985 .986 .987 .988 .989 .989 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Table 5. Impacts of RTAs with vs. without Labor Clauses on Minimum Wages and 
Employment Protection, for High-income Countries 
(Labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; TC indicators based on the fixed 1995 trade shares) 
Dependent variable: 
 
Statutory Minimum Wages  
in Local Currency, Nominal in Local Currency, Real 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
.193 
(.251) 
   -.500** 
(.214) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.399 
(1.26) 
   2.00** 
(.778) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 .075 
(.261) 
   -.677*** 
(.228) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.772 
(1.23) 
   1.56** 
(.715) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .231 
(.262) 
   -.771*** 
(.192) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -1.22 
(1.05) 
   .785 
(.966) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   .055 
(.337) 
   -.805*** 
(.223) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -1.57* 
(.736) 
   .337 
(.964) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.101 
(2.34) 
   -.984 
(2.36) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
1.01 
(1.14) 
   1.33 
(.920) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -1.61 
(1.53) 
   -2.51 
(1.75) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 2.74 
(3.40) 
   2.88 
(3.27) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -2.53* 
(1.41) 
   -4.12** 
(1.59) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  1.13 
(2.60) 
   2.84 
(2.78) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -3.83** 
(1.40) 
   -5.13** 
(1.60) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   0.167 
(1.95) 
   1.18 
(2.13) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
45.6*** 
(13.1) 
   61.7*** 
(9.48) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-49.6 
(32.0) 
   6.35 
(17.6) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 66.2*** 
(14.8) 
   82.8*** 
(14.9) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -33.7** 
(15.3) 
   32.0** 
(14.2) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  67.4*** 
(19.2) 
   84.9*** 
(15.5) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  50.1 
(99.6) 
   -86.5 
(101.8) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   54.1*** 
(17.3) 
   72.2*** 
(13.5) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -25.0 
(88.9) 
   -79.8 
(92.1) 
ln(GDP per capita) 11.5*** 
(2.70) 
10.9*** 
(2.71) 
9.35*** 
(2.57) 
9.92*** 
(2.53) 
8.17*** 
(2.20) 
8.55*** 
(2.17) 
7.71*** 
(2.14) 
8.73*** 
(2.58) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.502*** 
(.136) 
-.471*** 
(.136) 
-.394*** 
(.132) 
-.417*** 
(.126) 
-.362*** 
(.110) 
-.377*** 
(.109) 
-.331*** 
(.107) 
-.377*** 
(.128) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.014** 
(.006) 
-.013** 
(.005) 
-.015** 
(.007) 
-.009* 
(.005) 
-.018** 
(.007) 
-.015** 
(.006) 
-.010 
(.007) 
-.010 
(.007) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.023*** 
(.006) 
-.019*** 
(.005) 
-.018*** 
(.005) 
-.017*** 
(.006) 
-.020*** 
(.006) 
-.017** 
(.006) 
-.011 
(.007) 
-.012 
(.007) 
Political rights index -.155*** 
(.052) 
-.135*** 
(.046) 
-.134*** 
(.037) 
-.116** 
(.042) 
-.204*** 
(.046) 
-.192*** 
(.040) 
-.169*** 
(.038) 
-.151*** 
(.038) 
Civil liberty index -.004 
(.033) 
.004 
(.042) 
-.007 
(.036) 
-.013 
(.035) 
-.028 
(.024) 
-.015 
(.032) 
-.012 
(.035) 
-.017 
(.034) 
No. of observations 174 169 163 155 174 169 163 155 
Adjusted R2  .999 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999 
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(Table 5, continued) 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Statutory Minimum Wages 
Strictness of Employment Protection 
in Constant US Dollar 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
.258 
(.429) 
   -1.00** 
(.366) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
2.25* 
(1.97) 
   1.88 
(1.61) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 .074 
(.420) 
   -1.26** 
(.456) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 1.53 
(2.22) 
   .737 
(1.55) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.955** 
(.375) 
   -.772* 
(.440) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .889 
(2.74) 
   -.834 
(1.49) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -1.43 
(.902) 
   -.511 
(.358) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.397 
(1.84) 
   -3.10** 
(1.38) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-11.0 
(9.29) 
   -1.35 
(.933) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
1.52 
(1.23) 
   .135 
(1.55) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -5.13 
(4.14) 
   -1.05 
(.976) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 5.42 
(4.91) 
   .088 
(3.30) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -9.54** 
(3.67) 
   -.569 
(1.10) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  9.61* 
(4.42) 
   -.674 
(2.53) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -14.7** 
(4.97) 
   -.653 
(.923) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   1.36 
(8.75) 
   -.072 
(2.28) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
101.6** 
(32.6) 
   63.8*** 
(19.0) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
12.3 
(43.2) 
   -95.6*** 
(30.1) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 91.6** 
(33.9) 
   68.7*** 
(21.6) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 53.6 
(38.0) 
   -68.0*** 
(20.2) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  132.0** 
(48.7) 
   65.8** 
(29.2) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -537.1*** 
(150.8) 
   314.3 
(249.1) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   98.3 
(53.4) 
   52.5 
(40.7) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -297.9** 
(96.8) 
   307.7 
(329.6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 16.8** 
(6.80) 
19.3** 
(8.15) 
16.0 
(9.26) 
12.4 
(17.1) 
-7.68 
(4.68) 
-4.86 
(4.62) 
.267 
(4.73) 
3.31 
(5.74) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.749* 
(.344) 
-.871* 
(.414) 
-.695 
(.469) 
-.478 
(.860) 
.375 
(.235) 
.249 
(.231) 
.005 
(.234) 
-.142 
(.280) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.011 
(.010) 
.014 
(.013) 
.041* 
(.021) 
.045** 
(.016) 
.018* 
(.009) 
.016** 
(.007) 
.007 
(.012) 
.010 
(.011) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.062** 
(.024) 
-.054* 
(.026) 
-.033 
(.021) 
-.038 
(.025) 
-.008 
(.012) 
-.005 
(.011) 
-.002 
(.011) 
.003 
(.009) 
Political rights index -.167 
(.154) 
-.128 
(.150) 
-.070 
(.137) 
-.018 
(.192) 
-.048 
(.111) 
-.038 
(.102) 
-.026 
(.098) 
.027 
(.104) 
Civil liberty index -.163 
(.111) 
-.052 
(.056) 
-.039 
(.087) 
-.036 
(.112) 
-.127*** 
(.038) 
-.113** 
(.041) 
-.096** 
(.035) 
-.085** 
(.034) 
No. of observations 104 99 93 85 289 271 253 234 
Adjusted R2  .994 .992 .988 .941 .990 .991 .993 .994 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Impacts of RTAs with vs. without Labor Clauses on Minimum Wages and 
Employment Protection, for Middle-income Countries 
(Labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; TC indicators based on the fixed 1995 trade shares) 
Dependent variable: 
 
Statutory Minimum Wages  
in Local Currency, Nominal in Local Currency, Real 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.115 
(.186) 
   .002 
(.139) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.804*** 
(.241) 
   -.448*** 
(.140) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.122 
(.173) 
   .037 
(.129) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.647*** 
(.189) 
   -.345*** 
(.116) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.123 
(.159) 
   .066 
(.109) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.513*** 
(.166) 
   -.229** 
(.114) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.095 
(.144) 
   .142 
(.096) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.177 
(.277) 
   -.067 
(.131) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.039 
(.415) 
   .410 
(.330) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.818 
(.972) 
   .243 
(.260) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.199 
(.372) 
   .281 
(.268) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.623 
(.817) 
   .207 
(.211) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.214 
(.329) 
   .239 
(.221) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.300 
(.547) 
   .261 
(.232) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.239 
(.297) 
   .173 
(.193) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.856 
(.660) 
   -.288 
(.337) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-12.3 
(7.61) 
   -4.64 
(3.07) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-2.74 
(5.40) 
   -1.67 
(1.77) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -8.50 
(6.23) 
   -2.92 
(2.25) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -1.85 
(4.88) 
   -1.49 
(1.68) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -7.92* 
(4.53) 
   -3.50 
(2.34) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -2.34 
(4.61) 
   -2.72 
(2.01) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -8.16 
(5.14) 
   -4.86 
(3.82) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -1.73 
(3.39) 
   -1.83 
(1.98) 
ln(GDP per capita) 3.76 
(4.04) 
3.31 
(3.72) 
2.79 
(2.98) 
2.46 
(2.50) 
1.76 
(2.49) 
1.23 
(2.26) 
.470 
(1.55) 
.098 
(1.25) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.192 
(.236) 
-.158 
(.217) 
-.128 
(.173) 
-.107 
(.143) 
-.056 
(.143) 
-.025 
(.130) 
.015 
(.092) 
.037 
(.075) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.014 
(.015) 
.006 
(.015) 
.010 
(.015) 
.017 
(.015) 
-.003 
(.010) 
-.003 
(.011) 
.001 
(.011) 
.003 
(.011) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.028* 
(.016) 
-.018 
(.018) 
-.003 
(.016) 
.004 
(.015) 
-.005 
(.012) 
.002 
(.011) 
.009 
(.008) 
.011 
(.007) 
Political rights index .060 
(.061) 
.049 
(.058) 
.050 
(.058) 
.049 
(.053) 
.020 
(.021) 
.012 
(.019) 
-.000 
(.020) 
.007 
(.021) 
Civil liberty index -.116 
(.094) 
-.133 
(.080) 
-.150** 
(.067) 
-.172*** 
(.061) 
-.062* 
(.031) 
-.060* 
(.031) 
-.058** 
(.027) 
-.058** 
(.026) 
No. of observations 537 518 496 473 537 518 496 473 
Adjusted R2  .989 .990 .992 .992 .996 .996 .996 .996 
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(Table 6, continued) 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Statutory Minimum Wages 
Strictness of Employment Protection 
in Constant US Dollar 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
.003 
(.213) 
   .151 
(.131) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.526** 
(.242) 
   .051 
(.094) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 .048 
(.183) 
   .085 
(.132) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.384* 
(.199) 
   .273 
(.221) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .113 
(.165) 
   .030 
(.171) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.251 
(.161) 
   .153 
(.196) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   .229 
(.169) 
   .040 
(.174) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.155 
(.167) 
   -.088 
(.220) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
.896 
(.565) 
   -.296* 
(.153) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.574 
(.483) 
   -1.16 
(1.41) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 .614 
(.513) 
   -.315 
(.210) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.528 
(.491) 
   -3.03 
(2.54) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .477 
(.493) 
   -.193 
(.349) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.354 
(.371) 
   -1.64 
(2.44) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   .291 
(.495) 
   -.110 
(.308) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -1.12 
(.873) 
   -.506 
(2.23) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-8.39* 
(4.39) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
1.24 
(2.66) 
   -7.31 
(10.4) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -4.64 
(4.17) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 2.58 
(2.60) 
   30.6 
(36.5) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -4.00 
(4.14) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  1.91 
(2.95) 
   1.48 
(1.88) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -8.87* 
(5.22) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   .547 
(2.31) 
   2.61 
(2.81) 
ln(GDP per capita) 1.58 
(3.22) 
1.00 
(3.01) 
.646 
(2.55) 
.762 
(2.18) 
5.18 
(3.98) 
4.15 
(3.78) 
5.01 
(4.63) 
4.52 
(6.35) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 .007 
(.191) 
.045 
(.180) 
.064 
(.156) 
.062 
(.133) 
-.295 
(.220) 
-.230 
(.208) 
-.281 
(.247) 
-.263 
(.335) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.006 
(.012) 
.004 
(.013) 
.009 
(.014) 
.009 
(.014) 
.024 
(.026) 
.022 
(.026) 
.020 
(.033) 
.023 
(.038) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.016* 
(.009) 
-.009 
(.009) 
.000 
(.009) 
.001 
(.009) 
-.015 
(.022) 
-.017 
(.024) 
-.010 
(.029) 
-.011 
(.036) 
Political rights index -.002 
(.030) 
-.009 
(.032) 
-.018 
(.038) 
-.003 
(.028) 
.069 
(.042) 
.107 
(.061) 
.121 
(.070) 
.127 
(.075) 
Civil liberty index -.038 
(.061) 
-.049 
(.056) 
-.061 
(.052) 
-.082 
(.052) 
.008 
(.028) 
-.015 
(.029) 
-.018 
(.027) 
-.005 
(.031) 
No. of observations 517 498 476 453 112 106 100 94 
Adjusted R2  .978 .979 .981 .982 .967 .966 .963 .961 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7. Impacts of RTAs with vs. without Labor Clauses on Minimum Wages and 
Employment Protection, for Low-income Countries 
(Labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; TC indicators based on the fixed 1995 trade shares) 
Dependent variable: 
 
Statutory Minimum Wages  
in Local Currency, Nominal in Local Currency, Real 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
.329 
(.415) 
   .520 
(.370) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-2.81 
(2.26) 
   -1.17 
(1.48) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 -66.1*** 
(13.5) 
   -65.4*** 
(10.8) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -5.55*** 
(2.01) 
   -3.36** 
(1.39) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  2.71 
(12.1) 
   .717 
(10.6) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -4.53 
(2.71) 
   -3.05* 
(1.73) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   .806** 
(.357) 
   1.07*** 
(.371) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -13.7*** 
(2.80) 
   -9.25** 
(3.47) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
5.01 
(4.19) 
   6.03* 
(3.47) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
1.38 
(2.16) 
   1.21 
(1.28) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 890.1*** 
(182.2) 
   884.7*** 
(146.6) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 2.51 
(1.79) 
   1.84 
(1.19) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  -18.6 
(162.9) 
   11.6 
(142.1) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  1.30 
(2.35) 
   1.20 
(1.29) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   4.65** 
(2.14) 
   2.92 
(2.00) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   4.52*** 
(1.08) 
   3.36** 
(1.35) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
-19.9 
(27.7) 
   -22.4 
(21.5) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-7.60 
(8.03) 
   -5.24 
(7.80) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 -3771.1*** 
(774.9) 
   -3753.3*** 
(623.5) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -7.91 
(5.21) 
   -7.99 
(4.89) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  86.3 
(691.0) 
   -44.5 
(603.4) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -5.04 
(3.44) 
   -5.49* 
(3.09) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -5.35* 
(2.66) 
   -5.12** 
(1.89) 
ln(GDP per capita) -3.25 
(5.89) 
-3.18 
(5.90) 
-1.85 
(5.70) 
5.24 
(7.70) 
-2.94 
(5.59) 
-2.25 
(5.43) 
-2.08 
(5.08) 
1.56 
(7.37) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 .362 
(.366) 
.363 
(.366) 
.271 
(.349) 
-.217 
(.492) 
.360 
(.347) 
.315 
(.336) 
.296 
(.311) 
.030 
(.468) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.020 
(.027) 
-.009 
(.025) 
-.011 
(.027) 
-.006 
(.030) 
-.007 
(.025) 
.004 
(.024) 
.008 
(.025) 
.009 
(.026) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.011 
(.035) 
-.006 
(.030) 
-.020 
(.026) 
-.028 
(.026) 
-.025 
(.029) 
-.010 
(.028) 
-.018 
(.025) 
-.027 
(.025) 
Political rights index .112 
(.119) 
.124 
(.108) 
.092 
(.109) 
.042 
(.118) 
.066 
(.117) 
.075 
(.101) 
.057 
(.105) 
.043 
(.106) 
Civil liberty index -.265 
(.202) 
-.332* 
(.194) 
-.287 
(.197) 
-.162 
(.171) 
-.176 
(.208) 
-.251 
(.204) 
-.180 
(.193) 
-.038 
(.136) 
No. of observations 148 142 136 129 148 142 136 129 
Adjusted R2  .984 .986 .985 .987 .988 .989 .989 .990 
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(Table 7, continued) 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Statutory Minimum Wages 
Strictness of Employment Protection 
in Constant US Dollar 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
.348 
(.401) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-1.66 
(1.73) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -78.2*** 
(12.5) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -4.36** 
(1.63) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -2.09 
(9.09) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -3.78* 
(2.15) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   1.24*** 
(.301) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -11.8*** 
(2.77) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
6.50 
(4.10) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
1.81 
(1.41) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 1053.8*** 
(169.1) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 2.52* 
(1.35) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  50.1 
(121.9) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  1.42 
(1.76) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   2.80* 
(1.64) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   3.97*** 
(.977) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-38.7 
(25.0) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-9.20 
(8.04) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -4480.2*** 
(719.3) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -10.7* 
(5.60) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -213.0 
(517.0) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -6.49* 
(3.65) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -5.65*** 
(1.94) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
ln(GDP per capita) -5.33 
(5.68) 
-4.79 
(5.30) 
-3.71 
(4.87) 
2.31 
(6.49) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 .533 
(.353) 
.505 
(.334) 
.431 
(.304) 
.011 
(.418) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.010 
(.026) 
.010 
(.022) 
.017 
(.023) 
.023 
(.023) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.033 
(.028) 
-.016 
(.026) 
-.025 
(.023) 
-.035 
(.023) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
Political rights index .050 
(.120) 
.083 
(.094) 
.068 
(.100) 
.048 
(.095) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
Civil liberty index -.201 
(.207) 
-.296 
(.195) 
-.220 
(.190) 
-.072 
(.118) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
N.A. 
(--) 
No. of observations 148 142 136 129 0 0 0 0 
Adjusted R2  .973 .979 .979 .981 -- -- -- -- 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 8. Impacts of the First RTA with Labor Clauses on Minimum Wages and 
Employment Protection 
(RTAs with labor clauses defined by the conservative classification) 
 
Dependent variable: Statutory Minimum Wages 
Strictness of 
Employment 
Protection 
in Local Currency, 
Nominal 
in Local Currency, 
Real 
in Constant US 
Dollar 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
-.107 
(.099) 
-.051 
(.033) 
-.034 
(.046) 
-.010 
(.034) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.335
*
 
(.183) 
.218
**
 
(.084) 
.260
**
 
(.111) 
-.009 
(.069) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
-.116 
(.107) 
-.045 
(.046) 
-.072 
(.072) 
-.070 
(.076) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.332
*
 
(.187) 
.222
**
 
(.094) 
.316
**
 
(.128) 
.007 
(.099) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
-.145 
(.142) 
-.092 
(.058) 
-.144 
(.092) 
-.034 
(.101) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.434 
(.284) 
.324
*
 
(.169) 
.557
**
 
(.231) 
-.056 
(.104) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
-.119 
(.146) 
-.075 
(.055) 
-.125 
(.088) 
.010 
(.109) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.277 
(.200) 
.284
***
 
(.101) 
.556
***
 
(.152) 
-.160
*
 
(.091) 
ln(GDP per capita) 4.31
**
 
(1.82) 
-.151 
(1.34) 
-1.60 
(1.91) 
.237 
(2.22) 
ln(GDP per capita)
2
 -.238
**
 
(.110) 
.033 
(.079) 
.139 
(.109) 
-.019 
(.118) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.004 
(.011) 
-.001 
(.009) 
.008 
(.009) 
.016
*
 
(.008) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.004 
(.012) 
.007 
(.007) 
.008 
(.007) 
-.008 
(.009) 
Political rights index .081 
(.059) 
-.020 
(.034) 
.015 
(.033) 
.076 
(.046) 
Civil liberty index -.227
*
 
(.128) 
.002 
(.040) 
-.069 
(.059) 
-.037 
(.033) 
No. of observations 491 491 412 397 
Adjusted R
2
  .991 .998 .988 .986 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included.  
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Table 9. Impacts of the First RTA with Labor Clauses on Minimum Wages and 
Employment Protection, for High-income Countries 
(RTAs with labor clauses defined by the conservative classification) 
 
Dependent variable: Statutory Minimum Wages 
Strictness of 
Employment 
Protection 
in Local Currency, 
Nominal 
in Local Currency, 
Real 
in Constant US 
Dollar 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
.007 
(.028) 
-.040 
(.035) 
.107 
(.131) 
-.074
**
 
(.027) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.312
***
 
(.051) 
.284
***
 
(.087) 
-.286 
(.344) 
.014 
(.085) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
-.013 
(.035) 
-.061 
(.040) 
.104 
(.097) 
-.148
*
 
(.076) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.405
***
 
(.039) 
.364
***
 
(.049) 
-.105 
(.217) 
-.038 
(.115) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
-.063 
(.065) 
-.125
**
 
(.042) 
.136
*
 
(.064) 
-.087 
(.160) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.416
***
 
(.088) 
.400
***
 
(.089) 
-.047 
(.193) 
-.123 
(.139) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
.084 
(.050) 
-.023 
(.056) 
.036 
(.189) 
-.079 
(.187) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.077
***
 
(.021) 
.100
**
 
(.037) 
.075 
(.110) 
-.290
***
 
(.082) 
ln(GDP per capita) 12.3
***
 
(.999) 
9.69
***
 
(1.18) 
17.8
*
 
(8.06) 
-10.3
***
 
(3.55) 
ln(GDP per capita)
2
 -.552
***
 
(.050) 
-.421
***
 
(.058) 
-.789 
(.424) 
.503
**
 
(.184) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.015
**
 
(.005) 
-.014
**
 
(.006) 
.010 
(.019) 
.018
**
 
(.008) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.018
**
 
(.007) 
-.014
*
 
(.007) 
-.025 
(.034) 
-.007 
(.013) 
Political rights index -.127
***
 
(.041) 
-.156
***
 
(.042) 
.008 
(.173) 
-.081 
(.106) 
Civil liberty index .005 
(.031) 
-.014 
(.027) 
.005 
(.022) 
-.066
*
 
(.033) 
No. of observations 155 155 85 291 
Adjusted R
2
  .999 .999 .996 .990 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included.  
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Table 10. Impacts of the First RTA with Labor Clauses on Minimum Wages and 
Employment Protection, for Middle-income Countries 
(RTAs with labor clauses defined by the conservative classification) 
 
Dependent variable: Statutory Minimum Wages 
Strictness of 
Employment 
Protection 
in Local Currency, 
Nominal 
in Local Currency, 
Real 
in Constant US 
Dollar 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
-.164 
(.130) 
-.014 
(.039) 
-.047 
(.060) 
2.16
**
 
(.785) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.295 
(.241) 
.137 
(.094) 
.201 
(.159) 
-2.63
**
 
(.952) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
-.088 
(.147) 
.030 
(.060) 
-.012 
(.090) 
2.45
**
 
(.844) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.123 
(.249) 
.082 
(.118) 
.126 
(.183) 
-2.97 
(.991) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
-.061 
(.178) 
.010 
(.060) 
-.048 
(.093) 
2.07
*
 
(.992) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.091 
(.289) 
.067 
(.106) 
.203 
(.190) 
-2.52
*
 
(1.21) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
-.093 
(.190) 
.006 
(.059) 
-.091 
(.108) 
2.51 
(1.62) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.023 
(.272) 
.153 
(.127) 
.404
**
 
(.168) 
-3.05 
(1.94) 
ln(GDP per capita) -1.74 
(3.61) 
-2.66 
(2.29) 
-5.61 
(3.93) 
4.80 
(3.21) 
ln(GDP per capita)
2
 .110 
(.218) 
.186 
(.133) 
.389
*
 
(.226) 
-.276 
(.172) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.007 
(.011) 
.000 
(.009) 
.002 
(.010) 
.025 
(.029) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.015 
(.011) 
.005 
(.005) 
.007 
(.008) 
-.012 
(.023) 
Political rights index .155
*
 
(.081) 
-.002 
(.044) 
.023 
(.045) 
.062 
(.044) 
Civil liberty index -.333
**
 
(.158) 
-.041 
(.041) 
-.105 
(.068) 
.021 
(.031) 
No. of observations 308 308 299 106 
Adjusted R
2
  .992 .998 .985 .941 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included.  
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Table A1. Impacts of RTA with and without Labor Clauses: Actual Wages vs. Statutory Minimum Wages 
(RTAs with labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; and RTA trade concentrations are based on the RTA partners’ 
manufacturing trade share as of 1995.) 
 
Dependent variable: 
Mean Monthly Earnings, Statutory Minimum Wages (log-scaled) 
in Constant US Dollars (log-scaled) in Local Currency, Nominal in Local Currency, Real in Constant US Dollar 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
.183 
(.727) 
   -.030 
(.119) 
   -.007 
(.117) 
   .049 
(.141) 
   
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-1 
1.20 
(1.45) 
   -.935*** 
(.331) 
   -.436* 
(.250) 
   -.645** 
(.313) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 .119 
(.817) 
   -.027 
(.119) 
   .051 
(.118) 
   .096 
(.133) 
  
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-2 
 1.10 
(1.53) 
   -.993*** 
(.336) 
   -.488** 
(.236) 
   -.670** 
(.303) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  .074 
(.650) 
   -.010 
(.132) 
   .086 
(.114) 
   .171 
(.126) 
 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-3 
  .272 
(1.39) 
   -.730*** 
(.244) 
   -.430** 
(.201) 
   -.520** 
(.232) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.741 
(.647) 
   .019 
(.176) 
   .182 
(.129) 
   .288* 
(.151) 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-4 
   1.13 
(1.92) 
   -.130 
(.539) 
   -.422*** 
(.148) 
   -.540*** 
(.149) 
ln(GDP per capita) -21.6** 
(10.5) 
-23.8* 
(12.5) 
-25.0* 
(13.2) 
-28.0** 
(13.9) 
6.84*** 
(2.22) 
7.16*** 
(2.56) 
7.17*** 
(2.69) 
6.86** 
(2.75) 
4.12 
(2.51) 
4.57 
(2.82) 
4.39 
(3.05) 
4.23 
(3.04) 
2.95 
(2.36) 
3.13 
(2.58) 
3.13 
(2.69) 
3.26 
(2.63) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 1.35** 
(.578) 
1.49** 
(.696) 
1.54** 
(.717) 
1.74** 
(.753) 
-.325** 
(.136) 
-.345** 
(.154) 
-.338** 
(.159) 
-.320* 
(.161) 
-.150 
(.145) 
-.181 
(.163) 
-.174 
(.174) 
-.170 
(.174) 
-.031 
(.141) 
-.044 
(.155) 
-.045 
(.160) 
-.056 
(.159) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employ.) 
-.056 
(.096) 
-.055 
(.108) 
-.060 
(.115) 
-.069 
(.116) 
-.011 
(.013) 
-.011 
(.013) 
-.013 
(.012) 
-.009 
(.013) 
-.023* 
(.014) 
-.022 
(.014) 
-.019 
(.014) 
-.018 
(.013) 
-.001 
(.014) 
-.000 
(.013) 
.000 
(.013) 
.002 
(.012) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.088 
(.059) 
.079 
(.060) 
.073 
(.057) 
.078 
(.056) 
-.026* 
(.015) 
-.013 
(.016) 
.002 
(.015) 
.003 
(.017) 
-.013 
(.012) 
-.006 
(.012) 
.001 
(.011) 
.001 
(.011) 
-.031*** 
(.010) 
-.022** 
(.010) 
-.013 
(.010) 
-.014 
(.011) 
Political rights index -.022 
(.285) 
.021 
(.309) 
.120 
(.316) 
.057 
(.302) 
.075 
(.078) 
.034 
(.071) 
-.014 
(.062) 
-.023 
(.059) 
-.002 
(.058) 
-.026 
(.055) 
-.041 
(.052) 
-.019 
(.050) 
-.002 
(.057) 
-.020 
(.054) 
-.037 
(.048) 
-.017 
(.046) 
Civil liberty index -.522 
(.324) 
-.554 
(.352) 
-.466 
(.336) 
-.419 
(.330) 
-.156 
(.094) 
-.141* 
(.084) 
-.156** 
(.071) 
-.157** 
(.062) 
-.038 
(.055) 
-.034 
(.053) 
-.027 
(.054) 
-.036 
(.053) 
-.055 
(.057) 
-.047 
(.053) 
-.053 
(.050) 
-.074 
(.050) 
No. of observations 512 489 463 432 512 489 463 432 512 489 463 432 512 489 463 432 
Adjusted R2  .795 .787 .779 .774 .991 .992 .993 .994 .994 .994 .995 .995 .983 .984 .986 .987 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Only the “common” country-year observations for which the data on both actual 
wages/earnings and statutory minimum wages are available are used for all the estimation. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Table A2. Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Minimum Wages and Employment Protection 
(RTAs with labor clauses defined by the liberal classification; and RTA trade concentrations are based on the RTA partners’ 
manufacturing trade share as of 1995.) 
 
Dependent variable: Statutory Minimum Wages 
Strictness of Employment Protection 
in Local Currency, Nominal in Local Currency, Real in Constant US Dollar 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
-.040 
(.122) 
   .015 
(.096) 
   .053 
(.129) 
   -.088 
(.065) 
   
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-1 
-.810*** 
(.266) 
   -.365** 
(.183) 
   -.461** 
(.215) 
   .068 
(.148) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.038 
(.121) 
   .055 
(.090) 
   .100 
(.123) 
   -.135 
(.080) 
  
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.845*** 
(.285) 
   -.472** 
(.189) 
   -.535** 
(.221) 
   .141 
(.125) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.034 
(.133) 
   .094 
(.096) 
   .182 
(.134) 
   -.118 
(.089) 
 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.805** 
(.327) 
   -.475** 
(.217) 
   -.548** 
(.267) 
   .005 
(.148) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.029 
(.118) 
   .139* 
(.081) 
   .248* 
(.125) 
   -.070 
(.065) 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.478 
(.298) 
   -.343* 
(.178) 
   -.434* 
(.220) 
   -.122 
(.137) 
ln(GDP per capita) 5.08** 
(2.18) 
5.05** 
(2.27) 
4.62** 
(2.31) 
4.20* 
(2.28) 
2.67 
(1.94) 
2.74 
(2.06) 
2.48 
(2.12) 
2.23 
(2.09) 
1.62 
(2.21) 
1.66 
(2.24) 
1.52 
(2.22) 
1.50 
(2.15) 
.039 
(2.14) 
-.099 
(1.83) 
-.352 
(1.80) 
-.821 
(1.83) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.228* 
(.124) 
-.222* 
(.128) 
-.193 
(.128) 
-.167 
(.127) 
-.070 
(.102) 
-.076 
(.108) 
-.065 
(.110) 
-.055 
(.110) 
.040 
(.127) 
.038 
(.128) 
.043 
(.127) 
.042 
(.124) 
-.005 
(.114) 
.011 
(.098) 
.024 
(.097) 
.041 
(.100) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employ.) 
-.002 
(.012) 
-.007 
(.012) 
-.005 
(.013) 
.001 
(.012) 
-.016 
(.011) 
-.017 
(.012) 
-.014 
(.012) 
-.011 
(.010) 
-.000 
(.011) 
-.002 
(.012) 
.001 
(.012) 
.005 
(.011) 
.009 
(.006) 
.005 
(.007) 
.002 
(.008) 
.004 
(.009) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.016 
(.013) 
-.011 
(.013) 
-.004 
(.011) 
-.000 
(.011) 
-.009 
(.009) 
-.003 
(.008) 
.001 
(.007) 
.002 
(.007) 
-.019** 
(.009) 
-.013 
(.008) 
-.008 
(.007) 
-.008 
(.008) 
-.010 
(.010) 
-.006 
(.009) 
-.002 
(.009) 
-.001 
(.008) 
Political rights index .039 
(.054) 
.031 
(.051) 
.031 
(.049) 
.029 
(.047) 
-.009 
(.024) 
-.016 
(.022) 
-.025 
(.021) 
-.016 
(.023) 
-.017 
(.033) 
-.022 
(.032) 
-.032 
(.034) 
-.014 
(.025) 
.081** 
(.030) 
.090*** 
(.033) 
.057 
(.044) 
.033 
(.046) 
Civil liberty index -.111 
(.079) 
-.118* 
(.066) 
-.124** 
(.057) 
-.129** 
(.055) 
-.016 
(.039) 
-.014 
(.037) 
-.006 
(.035) 
-.003 
(.034) 
-.012 
(.054) 
-.021 
(.048) 
-.022 
(.044) 
-.040 
(.044) 
-.056** 
(.026) 
-.065** 
(.025) 
-.056** 
(.024) 
-.050* 
(.025) 
No. of observations 859 829 795 757 859 829 795 757 769 739 705 667 402 378 354 329 
Adjusted R2  .988 .990 .991 .991 .994 .994 .995 .995 .983 .984 .985 .985 .987 .988 .989 .989 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Table A3. Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Minimum Wages and Employment Protection 
(RTAs with labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; and RTA trade concentrations are based on the RTA partners’ 
manufacturing trade share in the current year.) 
 
Dependent variable: Statutory Minimum Wages 
Strictness of Employment Protection 
in Local Currency, Nominal in Local Currency, Real in Constant US Dollar 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
-.027 
(.132) 
   .030 
(.100) 
   .077 
(.129) 
   -.088 
(.064) 
   
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-1 
-.677** 
(.267) 
   -.320 
(.233) 
   -.310 
(.253) 
   .061 
(.136) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.030 
(.130) 
   .066 
(.093) 
   .117 
(.124) 
   -.138* 
(.082) 
  
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.677** 
(.261) 
   -.403* 
(.234) 
   -.370 
(.238) 
   .137 
(.118) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.017 
(.142) 
   .106 
(.099) 
   .196 
(.134) 
   -.124 
(.093) 
 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.579** 
(.259) 
   -.337 
(.217) 
   -.322 
(.211) 
   .044 
(.119) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.012 
(.126) 
   .148* 
(.083) 
   .251** 
(.122) 
   -.077 
(.069) 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.315 
(.262) 
   -.270 
(.173) 
   -.297* 
(.172) 
   -.040 
(.095) 
ln(GDP per capita) 4.94** 
(2.23) 
4.71* 
(2.44) 
4.07 
(2.60) 
3.87 
(2.44) 
2.63 
(1.91) 
2.57 
(2.09) 
2.16 
(2.20) 
2.01 
(2.13) 
1.56 
(2.23) 
1.43 
(2.35) 
1.08 
(2.42) 
1.16 
(2.28) 
.015 
(2.10) 
-.126 
(1.80) 
-.360 
(1.79) 
-.859 
(1.83) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.223* 
(.128) 
-.205 
(.140) 
-.164 
(.148) 
-.150 
(.138) 
-.069 
(.101) 
-.069 
(.112) 
-.048 
(.117) 
-.044 
(.114) 
.042 
(.129) 
.049 
(.136) 
.067 
(.140) 
.060 
(.133) 
-.003 
(.113) 
.012 
(.097) 
.025 
(.096) 
.044 
(.099) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employ.) 
-.002 
(.012) 
-.005 
(.012) 
-.003 
(.012) 
.002 
(.012) 
-.016 
(.011) 
-.017 
(.011) 
-.013 
(.011) 
-.010 
(.010) 
-.001 
(.011) 
-.001 
(.012) 
.003 
(.012) 
.006 
(.010) 
.009 
(.006) 
.005 
(.006) 
.001 
(.008) 
.003 
(.009) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.015 
(.012) 
-.010 
(.013) 
-.004 
(.011) 
-.000 
(.012) 
-.008 
(.009) 
-.002 
(.008) 
.001 
(.007) 
.002 
(.007) 
-.018** 
(.009) 
-.013 
(.008) 
-.008 
(.008) 
-.009 
(.008) 
-.010 
(.010) 
-.007 
(.009) 
-.002 
(.009) 
-.001 
(.008) 
Political rights index .031 
(.058) 
.023 
(.055) 
.024 
(.051) 
.027 
(.048) 
-.013 
(.024) 
-.021 
(.022) 
-.030 
(.022) 
-.019 
(.023) 
-.021 
(.035) 
-.027 
(.035) 
-.036 
(.037) 
-.017 
(.026) 
.080*** 
(.028) 
.089*** 
(.031) 
.060 
(.044) 
.037 
(.047) 
Civil liberty index -.109 
(.078) 
-.113* 
(.066) 
-.116** 
(.058) 
-.125** 
(.056) 
-.014 
(.038) 
-.011 
(.036) 
-.001 
(.035) 
.000 
(.034) 
-.010 
(.054) 
-.016 
(.048) 
-.015 
(.045) 
-.035 
(.045) 
-.057** 
(.026) 
-.066** 
(.025) 
-.057** 
(.024) 
-.050** 
(.024) 
No. of observations 861 830 795 757 861 830 795 757 771 740 705 667 402 378 354 329 
Adjusted R2  .988 .990 .990 .991 .994 .994 .994 .995 .982 .984 .985 .985 .987 .988 .989 .989 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Figure 1.  Shifts in the Numbers of All RTAs and RTAs with Labor Clauses 
 
 
Notes:  
1.  The numbers count RTAs that became into force (and were notified to the World Trade 
Organization) in each period.  
2. The generalized system of preferences (GSPs) are excluded from the numbers. 
3.  RTAs with labor clauses are defined by the ‘liberal’ classification that satisfy (only) the 
condition that the agreement has an extensive set(s) of articles that stipulates the items/issues 
for which the signatory countries shall cooperate and the procedures for consultations and/or 
dispute settlement on issues concerning labor conditions, as a part (chapter(s) or title(s)) of 
the main body of the RTA or a separate side agreement or MOU.  
 
 
